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Capability Based Assurance and Follow-the-Risk
CBA:  Decompose mission into mission, system, and software capabilities that become the scope for IV&V analysis
FTR:  As understanding is gained, identify areas of risk or concern in order to inform prioritization of IV&V analysis and 
develop specific assurance objectives
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Mission drivers for autonomy
1. Communication constraints outgrow 
decision-making cadence
2. Time-critical decisions for control, health, 
or life support
3. Decisions can use rich on-board data
4. Local decisions could improve robustness 
& reduce complexity
5. Autonomy can reduce system cost or 
improve performance
6. Variability in training and proficiency is 
unacceptable in manual control
Missions supported by IV&V:
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST)
Europa Clipper
Parker Solar Probe (PSP)
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Identifying areas of autonomy risk
Functional
Requires understanding of mission goals and 
objectives
• What mission capabilities are supported by 
autonomy?  Are they safety-critical?
• How does the autonomy capability make decisions?
• Are there cases in which it can make a bad 
decision?
• What are the mission conditions under which 
autonomous control is allowed?
Non-Functional
Requires understanding of system and software 
development
• How do the various parts of the autonomy 
architecture interact?
• What are the boundaries and constraints of allowed 
autonomous decisions?
• Can conflicting decisions collide?
• What is the interaction between humans and 
autonomy?
JWST Example
• JWST requirement to operate for 4 weeks without 
ground intervention
JWST Example
• Highly distributed JWST Fault Management (FM) 
architecture
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Providing assurance for autonomy risks
• Assurance needs are developed from the identified risks and concerns
• Autonomy risks include increased system/software complexity (exploding state space), as well as multi-
faceted, possibly non-deterministic, decision-making
• IV&V wants to assure that autonomous software used to perform mission- and safety-critical capabilities:
1. Executes those capabilities as intended
2. Does not introduce unwanted or unnecessary behaviors, and
3. Responds appropriately to adverse conditions, including environments that are not well 
understood or difficult to model/simulate
JWST example
• IV&V wants to assure that the JWST software can operate autonomously over a period of 4 weeks while safely 
responding to any introduced faults
• IV&V wants to assure that any potential conflicts in JWST’s distributed FM response behavior are not credible or 
appropriately mitigated
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Identifying/developing tools and techniques
• Autonomous operations are often critical and require high rigor IV&V analysis to assure 
correct functionality
• Autonomy implementation almost always requires tailored work instructions for IV&V 
analysis to address non-functional considerations
• IV&V has a vast amount of experience to draw from in order to find the best way to get the 
evidence needed to address the identified risk
• Catalog of Methods (COMPASS)
• Adverse Condition Awareness Tool (ACAT)
• Jon McBride Software Testing and Research Lab (J-STAR)
• When the tool or technique doesn’t already exist, we create it or evolve it from an existing 
tool or technique
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JWST autonomy assurance techniques
Long-duration testing in the JWST 
Integrated Simulation and Test (JIST) 
software-only simulator
Though developed by IV&V’s J-STAR 
Lab, JIST was adopted by the JSWT 
developer to help mitigate test 
schedule risks
End-to-End FM verification through 
database development and analysis
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The future of IV&V for autonomy
• High value, high risk NASA missions have thus far addressed the autonomy mission drivers with deterministic solutions
• Complex and highly critical software functions operate using preloaded conditions to implement autonomy
• IV&V efforts have therefore been ensuring that the autonomy software correctly and completely implements the desired 
capabilities without introducing emergent behaviors
• Future missions may use autonomy in a less deterministic manner, introducing more decision making (e.g. artificial intelligence) in the 
software 
• Foreseen challenges:
• Characterization of the environment has less certainty, with the software responding to environmental challenges (e.g. routing 
around an obstruction in a rover’s path)
• Use of Monte Carlo simulation and automated testing to exercise the full operational space
• IV&V is heavily dependent on artifacts – what will future autonomy artifacts look like?
• Achieving configuration management of self-modifying autonomous systems
• The ability for IV&V to crack open the autonomous decision-making software and make it visible, understandable, and testable 
for IV&V analysts
• Understanding the competing agendas in autonomous decision-making software
• Autonomous systems will probably necessitate more validation methods as opposed to verification – what validation will be done 
by developers to assure their systems, and how does IV&V maintain independence?
IV&V of Autonomy 8
